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dc.contributor.authorAdrianova, Svetlana
dc.contributor.authorBaltagi, Badi H.
dc.contributor.authorDemetriades, Panicos
dc.contributor.authorFielding, David
dc.identifier.citationAdrianova, S., Baltagi, B. H., Demetriades, P., & Fielding, D. (2014). Ethnic Fractionalization, Governance and Loan Defaults in Africa (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 1408). University of Otago. Retrieved from
dc.identifier.issn1178-2293 (Online)
dc.description.abstractWe present a theoretical model of moral hazard and adverse selection in an imperfectly competitive loans market that is suitable for application to Africa. The model allows for variation in both the level of contract enforcement (depending on the quality of governance) and the degree of market segmentation (depending on the level of ethnic fractionalization). The model predicts a specific form of non-linearity in the effects of these variables on the loan default rate. Empirical analysis using African panel data for 111 individual banks in 29 countries over 2000-2008 provides strong evidence for these predictions. Our results have important implications for the conditions under which policy reform will enhance financial development.en_NZ
dc.publisherUniversity of Otagoen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Discussion Papers Seriesen_NZ
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International*
dc.subjectEthnic fractionalizationen_NZ
dc.subjectFinancial developmenten_NZ
dc.subjectAfrican Banksen_NZ
dc.subjectPanel dataen_NZ
dc.titleEthnic Fractionalization, Governance and Loan Defaults in Africaen_NZ
dc.typeDiscussion Paperen_NZ
otago.schoolOtago Business School / Department of Economicsen_NZ
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Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International