CEO Power and Rigged Compensation in New Zealand
|dc.contributor.author||Lynch, Xavier Philip|
|dc.identifier.citation||Lynch, X. P. (2015). CEO Power and Rigged Compensation in New Zealand (Thesis, Master of Business). University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/5664||en|
|dc.description.abstract||This thesis examines whether, or not, powerful Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in New Zealand are able to rig their own pay. Using a sample consisting of all eligible firms listed on the NZX from 1997 to 2012. I investigate three hypotheses with the goal of understanding the dynamics of the relationship between CEO compensation and power in the remuneration environment of New Zealand. First, I discuss the motivation for this thesis and develop the primary research question. Second, I review the existing literature on Agency Theory, Corporate Governance, and Human Capital and Ownership Determinants. Third, I develop a lagged fixed effects specification and an Auto Regressive (AR) specification to test three hypotheses. After performing the regressions I find that increased CEO compensation is positively associated with increased CEO power. Furthermore, I find that CEOs are able to extract excessive levels of compensation from the board. Rigging is more prevalent in firms with weak governance practices and in firms where institutional shareholdings are low. A CEO who has a seat on the board of directors, or when the total number of directors exceeds the median size, has the ability to rig their pay.|
|dc.publisher||University of Otago|
|dc.rights||All items in OUR Archive are provided for private study and research purposes and are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.|
|dc.subject||CEO on Board|
|dc.subject||Insiders on Board|
|dc.subject||Human Capital and Ownership|
|dc.title||CEO Power and Rigged Compensation in New Zealand|
|thesis.degree.discipline||Accountancy and Finance|
|thesis.degree.name||Master of Business|
|thesis.degree.grantor||University of Otago|
Files in this item
There are no files associated with this item.
This item is not available in full-text via OUR Archive.
If you are the author of this item, please contact us if you wish to discuss making the full text publicly available.