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dc.contributor.advisorGavaghan, Colin
dc.contributor.advisorKnott, Alistair
dc.contributor.authorBarnes, Curtis Reid
dc.date.available2017-10-27T01:23:23Z
dc.date.copyright2017
dc.identifier.citationBarnes, C. R. (2017). Law and Ethics of Morally Significant Machines: The case for pre-emptive prevention (Thesis, Master of Laws). University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/7646en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/7646
dc.description.abstractInterest in the ethics of Artificial Intelligence systems is dominated by the question of how these sorts of technologies will benefit or harm human individuals and societies. Much less attention is given to the ethics of our interaction with AI systems from the perspective of what may harm or benefit the systems themselves. Despite this, there is potential for future AI systems to be designed in a way that makes them either morally significant entities, or gives them the tools with which to develop degrees of moral significance, perhaps even personhood in the moral sense. This thesis proposes how certain contemporary paradigms in AI might in the future create a morally significant machine, perhaps even a machine person; one which can be harmed to a degree similar to ourselves. This type of system would be the first technology towards which the design of law and policy would be obliged to consider not just human best interests, but the best interests of the technology itself: how it is designed, what we can use it for, what can be done to it, and what we are duty-bound to provide it with. The thesis proposes a wide range of legal and social problems that the invention of such a system would engender, particularly in relation to paradigms like property, legal personality, and rights of both positive and negative nature. It also explores the fraught line-drawing problem of establishing which systems matter and which do not, and what the legal implications of this would be. It establishes that the net demands such a machine would place upon humans informs an argument that there should be a pre-emptive policy to prevent their creation, so as to mitigate harms to both human society and the machines themselves. When closely examined, the reality of a social partnership between persons – both human and machine – is too problematic and too profoundly challenging to the conception of anthropocentric hegemony to be justifiable.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversity of Otago
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dc.subjectArtificial Intelligence
dc.subjectAI
dc.subjectEthics
dc.subjectMoral Philosophy
dc.subjectLaw
dc.subjectRobot Rights
dc.subjectEmerging Technologies
dc.subjectRoboethics
dc.subjectRobot Ethics
dc.subjectEmbodied Cognition
dc.subjectGrounded Cognition
dc.subjectIntrinsic Motivation
dc.subjectMachine Learning
dc.subjectPersonhood
dc.subjectFuturology
dc.subjectHuman Rights
dc.subjectCivil Rights
dc.subjectPolitical Rights
dc.titleLaw and Ethics of Morally Significant Machines: The case for pre-emptive prevention
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.updated2017-10-27T01:08:11Z
dc.language.rfc3066en
thesis.degree.disciplineLaw
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Laws
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Otago
thesis.degree.levelMasters
otago.openaccessOpen
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