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Agency Problems and Audit Fees: Further Tests of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis
Griffin, Paul A; Lont, David H; Sun, Yuan
This study finds that the agency problems of companies with high free cash flow (FCF) and low growthopportunities induce auditors of companies in the United States to raise audit fees to compensate for the additional effort. We also find that high FCF companies with high growth prospects have higher audit fees. In both cases, higher debt levels moderate the increased fees, consistent with the role of debt as a monitoring mechanism. Other mechanisms to mitigate the agency costs of FCF such as dividend payout and share repurchase (not studied earlier) do not moderate the higher audit fees.
Conference: AAA 2007 Conference & AFAANZ 2007 Conference, AAA Chicago USA & AFAANZ Gold Coast Australia
Series: Accountancy Working Paper Series
Keywords: Audit fees; Free cash flow hypothesis; Agency problems