Number of bidders and the winner’s curse
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Cite this item:
Peeters, R., & Tenev, A. P. (2018). Number of bidders and the winner’s curse (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 1802). University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/7839
Permanent link to OUR Archive version:
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/7839
Abstract:
Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number
of bidders and the winner’s curse in terms of its occurrence and its expected harm. From a
design perspective, we find that both the number of bidders and the level of affiliation are
instrumental when choosing an auction format and whether to encourage or discourage
bidder participation.
Date:
2018-02
Publisher:
University of Otago
Series number:
1802
ISSN:
1178-2293
Keywords:
Winner’s curse; number of bidders; affiliated value auctions
Research Type:
Discussion Paper
Languages:
English
Collections
- Economics [301]
- Discussion Paper [428]
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