Is Secularism Neutral?
Ahdar, Rex
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Cite this item:
Ratio Juris, Vol. 26, Issue 3, pp. 404-429, 2013.
Permanent link to OUR Archive version:
http://hdl.handle.net/10523/8623
Abstract:
This article argues that secularism is not neutral. Secularization is a process, the secular state is a structure, whereas secularism is a political philosophy. Secularism takes two main forms: first, a “benevolent” secularism that endeavours to treat all religious and nonreligious belief systems even‐handedly, and, second, a “hostile” kind that privileges unbelief and excludes religion from the public sphere. I analyze the European Court of Human Rights decision in Lautsi v Italy, which illustrates these types. The article concludes that secularism as a political philosophy cannot be neutral, and the secular state is not neutral in its effects, standpoint, governing assumptions or treatment of religious truth claims.
Date:
2013
Publisher:
Wiley-Blackwell
Pages:
404-429
Keywords:
religion; political philosophy
Research Type:
Journal Article
Languages:
English
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