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dc.contributor.authorAhdar, Rex
dc.date.available2018-11-29T03:14:50Z
dc.date.copyright2013
dc.identifier.citationRatio Juris, Vol. 26, Issue 3, pp. 404-429, 2013.en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/8623
dc.description.abstractThis article argues that secularism is not neutral. Secularization is a process, the secular state is a structure, whereas secularism is a political philosophy. Secularism takes two main forms: first, a “benevolent” secularism that endeavours to treat all religious and nonreligious belief systems even‐handedly, and, second, a “hostile” kind that privileges unbelief and excludes religion from the public sphere. I analyze the European Court of Human Rights decision in Lautsi v Italy, which illustrates these types. The article concludes that secularism as a political philosophy cannot be neutral, and the secular state is not neutral in its effects, standpoint, governing assumptions or treatment of religious truth claims.en_NZ
dc.language.isoenen_NZ
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwellen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofRatio Jurisen_NZ
dc.subjectreligionen_NZ
dc.subjectpolitical philosophyen_NZ
dc.titleIs Secularism Neutral?en_NZ
dc.typeJournal Articleen_NZ
dc.date.updated2018-11-28T20:19:05Z
otago.schoolUniversity of Otago Faculty of Lawen_NZ
otago.relation.issue3en_NZ
otago.relation.volume26en_NZ
otago.bitstream.endpage429en_NZ
otago.bitstream.startpage404en_NZ
otago.openaccessAbstract Onlyen_NZ
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