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dc.contributor.authorHall, Phillip Jen_NZ
dc.date.available2011-04-07T03:05:25Z
dc.date.copyright2005-03en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationHall, P. J. (2005). Resolving a public good dilemma using reward and sanction mechanisms (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 502). University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/888en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/888
dc.description.abstractThis study investigates the effect of reward and sanction mechanisms on contributions to a public good fund in an experimental context. Thirty-six participants were recruited from a first year economics course, based on their responses to a trust questionnaire. They participated in an experiment in which they were asked to contribute funds to public and private accounts. In addition, they were asked in the experimental conditions to contribute to a reward fund, a sanction fund, or both. The results of the experiment were that while both sanction and reward mechanisms were equally effective at inducing participants to contribute to a public good fund, the presence of a reward mechanism is critical in raising participant profits. No effect of trust on contributions or profit was found, but this may be due to a small sample pool.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherUniversity of Otagoen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Discussion Papers Seriesen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ/research/discussionpapers/DP_0502.pdfen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHB Economic Theoryen_NZ
dc.titleResolving a public good dilemma using reward and sanction mechanismsen_NZ
dc.typeDiscussion Paperen_NZ
dc.description.versionUnpublisheden_NZ
otago.bitstream.pages18en_NZ
otago.date.accession2006-02-03en_NZ
otago.schoolEconomicsen_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
otago.place.publicationDunedin, New Zealanden_NZ
dc.identifier.eprints218en_NZ
otago.school.eprintsEconomicsen_NZ
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otago.relation.number502en_NZ
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