Dissent, the Bill of Rights Act and the Supreme Court
|dc.identifier.citation||Geddis, A. (2013). Dissent, the Bill of Rights Act and the Supreme Court. 3 NZJPIL 11(1), (pp. 55-72).||en_NZ|
|dc.description.abstract||New Zealand's Supreme Court has on two occasions been required to consider the legal boundaries that apply to forms of dissenting behaviour. In Brooker v Police and Morse v Police, the Court simultaneously expands the judicial role in drawing the line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of dissent, and presents its conclusions as the relatively straightforward outcome of standard forms of statutory interpretation. This article explores why the Court felt this two-fold task was necessary, and examines the way in which it was achieved.||en_NZ|
|dc.publisher||Victoria University of Wellington Law School||en_NZ|
|dc.relation.ispartof||New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law||en_NZ|
|dc.title||Dissent, the Bill of Rights Act and the Supreme Court||en_NZ|
|otago.school||University of Otago Faculty of Law||en_NZ|
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