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dc.contributor.authorGeddis, Andrew
dc.date.available2019-02-03T20:22:37Z
dc.date.copyright2013
dc.identifier.citationGeddis, A. (2013). Dissent, the Bill of Rights Act and the Supreme Court. 3 NZJPIL 11(1), (pp. 55-72).en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/8891
dc.description.abstractNew Zealand's Supreme Court has on two occasions been required to consider the legal boundaries that apply to forms of dissenting behaviour. In Brooker v Police and Morse v Police, the Court simultaneously expands the judicial role in drawing the line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of dissent, and presents its conclusions as the relatively straightforward outcome of standard forms of statutory interpretation. This article explores why the Court felt this two-fold task was necessary, and examines the way in which it was achieved.en_NZ
dc.language.isoenen_NZ
dc.publisherVictoria University of Wellington Law Schoolen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofNew Zealand Journal of Public and International Lawen_NZ
dc.subjectPublic Lawen_NZ
dc.subjectAdministrative Lawen_NZ
dc.subjectHuman Rightsen_NZ
dc.subjectNew Zealanden_NZ
dc.titleDissent, the Bill of Rights Act and the Supreme Courten_NZ
dc.typeJournal Articleen_NZ
dc.date.updated2019-01-31T22:38:30Z
otago.schoolUniversity of Otago Faculty of Lawen_NZ
otago.relation.issue1en_NZ
otago.relation.volume11en_NZ
otago.bitstream.endpage72en_NZ
otago.bitstream.startpage55en_NZ
otago.openaccessAbstract Onlyen_NZ
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