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dc.contributor.authorScott, Struan
dc.date.available2019-02-10T20:50:20Z
dc.date.copyright1993
dc.identifier.citationScott, SR, The Argument of Subjective Devaluation: When is an Enrichment not an Enrichment? New Zealand Universities Law Review 15: 246-264 (1993).en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/8931
dc.description.abstractCase law suggests that the law responds differently to mistaken payments of money than to other mistaken transactions, i.e. the mistaken supply of goods or conferral of services. The Birksian theoretical explanation for this difference is that recipients of money are precluded from denying that they have been enriched while recipients of goods or services are not so precluded. If correct this explanation significantly limits the scope of the Law of Restitution. This article critically examines this argument and advances an alternative theoretical explanation for the results in case law.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen_NZ
dc.publisherThomson Reutersen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofNew Zealand Universities Law Reviewen_NZ
dc.subjectProperty lawen_NZ
dc.subjectLaw of restitutionen_NZ
dc.subjectUnjust enrichmenten_NZ
dc.subjectNew Zealanden_NZ
dc.titleRestitution and the Argument of Subjective Devaluationen_NZ
dc.typeJournal Articleen_NZ
dc.date.updated2019-02-10T20:17:48Z
otago.schoolUniversity of Otago Faculty of Lawen_NZ
otago.relation.volume15en_NZ
otago.bitstream.endpage264en_NZ
otago.bitstream.startpage246en_NZ
otago.openaccessOpenen_NZ
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