Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorFacchini, Giovannien_NZ
dc.contributor.authorOlarreaga, Marceloen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorSilva, Perien_NZ
dc.contributor.authorWillmann, Geralden_NZ
dc.date.available2011-04-07T03:05:31Z
dc.date.copyright2007-04en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationFacchini, G., Olarreaga, M., Silva, P., & Willmann, G. (2007). Substitutability and protectionism: Latin America’s trade policy and imports from China and India (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 705). Otago University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/906en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/906
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the trade policy response of Latin American governments to the rapid growth of China and India in world markets. To explain higher protection in sectors where a large share is imported from these countries, we extend the ‘protection for sale’ model to allow for different degrees of substitutability between domestically produced and imported varieties. The extension suggests that higher levels of protection towards Chinese goods can be explained by high substitutability between domestically produced goods and Chinese goods, whereas lower levels of protection towards goods imported from India can be explained by low substitutability with domestically produced goods. The data supports the extension to the ‘protection for sale’ model, which performs better than the original specification in terms of explaining Latin America’s structure of protection.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherOtago Universityen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Discussion Papers Seriesen_NZ
dc.subjectLatin Americaen_NZ
dc.subjectProtectionism.en_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHF Commerceen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHF5601 Accountingen_NZ
dc.subject.lcshH Social Sciences (General)en_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHB Economic Theoryen_NZ
dc.titleSubstitutability and protectionism: Latin America’s trade policy and imports from China and Indiaen_NZ
dc.typeDiscussion Paperen_NZ
dc.description.versionUnpublisheden_NZ
otago.bitstream.pages34en_NZ
otago.date.accession2007-04-12en_NZ
otago.schoolEconomicsen_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
otago.place.publicationDunedin, New Zealanden_NZ
dc.identifier.eprints590en_NZ
otago.school.eprintsEconomicsen_NZ
dc.description.referencesCalderon, C., 2006. Trade, Specialization and Cycle Synchronization: Explaining Output Comovement between Latin America, China and India. mimeo, The World Bank. Chang, P.L., 2005. Protection for sale under monopolistic competition. Journal of International Economics 66 (2), 509-526. Davidson, R. and Mackinnon, J. G., 1981. Several tests for model specification in the presence of alternative hypotheses. Econometrica 49(3), 781-793. Facchini G., Willmann G. and J. Van Biesebroeck, 2006 Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing. Canadian Journal of Economics 39(3), 845–873. Gawande, K., 1997. Generated regressors in linear and non linear models. Economic Letters 54(2), 119-126. Gawande, K., Bandhopadhyay, U., 2000. Is protection for sale? A test of the Grossman- Helpman theory of endogenous protection. Review of Economics and Statistics 89(1), 139-152. Gawande, K., Krishna, P., 2004. The political economy of trade policy: empirical approaches. In: Choi, K., Harrigan, J. (Eds.), Handbook of International Trade. New York: Basil Blackwell. Goldberg, P., Maggi, G., 1999. Protection for sale: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 89(5), 1135-1155. Grossman, G., Helpman, E., 1995. The politics of free trade agreement. American Eco- nomic Review 85(4), 667–690. Grossman, G., Helpman, E., 1994. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 84(4), 833-850. Hoekman, B. M. and Kostecki M. M. 2001 The political economy of the world trading system. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York Kee, H.L., Nicita, A. and Olarreaga, M., 2004, Import demand elasticities and trade distortions. Policy Research Working Paper #3452, The World Bank. Kee, H.L., Nicita, A. and Olarreaga, M., 2006, Estimating trade restrictiveness indices. Policy Research Working paper # 3840, The World Bank. McCalman, Ph. 2004. Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: an Empirical Investigation. Review of International Economics 12, 81-94. Mitra, D., 1999. Endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection: a long-run model of trade policy determination. American Economic Review 89(5), 1116-1134. Mitra, Devashish, Thomakos, D. and Ulubasoglu, M., 2002. Protection for sale in a developing country: democracy versus dictatorship. Review of Economics and Statistics 84. Mitra, Devashish, Thomakos, D. and Ulubasoglu, M., 2006. Can we obtain realistic estimates for the ’prtection for sale’ model? Canadian Journal of Economics 39: 187– 210 Nicita, A. and Olarreaga, M., 2006. Trade, production and protection, 1976-2004. Mimeo, The World Bank (available at www.worldbank.org/trade). Sato, K., 1967. A Two-Level Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution Production Function. Review of Economic Studies 34(2), 201-218. Staiger, D., and Stock, J. H., 1997. Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments. Econometrica 65, 557 - 586en_NZ
otago.relation.number705en_NZ
 Find in your library

Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record