Uneasy Co-existence: Pakistan’s National Security Approach and the Post-Cold War Security Environment

Abstract

This PhD thesis explores the paradox whereby the Pakistani state has emphasised improving its national security but has done so in a way that has increasingly led to greater insecurity in the country in the post-Cold War era. The thesis identifies the limitations of Pakistan’s military-centred national security approach, in which its military has consistently held a dominant position in policy-making and which has led to a worsening security situation. Since the inception of the Pakistani state in 1947, the perceived threat to national survival has enabled the military to build its own economic empire, command a disproportionate share of Pakistani government expenditure, and largely escape civilian control in shaping the national security policies of the country. However, the interests of Pakistan’s military-industrial complex have been increasingly challenged by a post-Cold War transformation of the regional and international security environment, particularly after the 9/11 terror attacks. Pakistan has gone from a country that at the time of independence was more worried about external security threats to one where internal security threats from home-grown terrorism and repercussions from Pakistan’s covert involvement in neighbouring external conflicts, have compounded its security problems. Nevertheless, despite the changing and worsening security problems, Islamabad has continued to prioritize military competition with India and intervention in Afghanistan. The thesis argues that the mismatch between Pakistan’s military-centric approach to national security and a transformed security environment has been facilitated and sustained by the embedded and parasitic interests of the country’s military-industrial complex.