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dc.contributor.authorRaff, Horsten_NZ
dc.contributor.authorRyan, Michaelen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorStähler, Franken_NZ
dc.date.available2011-04-07T03:05:52Z
dc.date.copyright2005-12en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationRaff, H., Ryan, M., & Stähler, F. (2005). The choice of market entry mode: greenfield Investment, M&A and joint ventures (Economics Discussion Papers Series No. 513). University of Otago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10523/973en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/973
dc.description.abstractMultinational firms may enter a market by different modes of foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper endogenizes both the mode and the size of FDI. It shows that the credibility of greenfield investment decides on the success of a joint venture or of a merger as it determines the outside option of the target firm. If greenfield investment is a credible threat and any other FDI option does not require any fixed cost, a joint venture will be agreed to by the local firm, and the foreign firm prefers a joint venture to a merger. In case of fixed costs across the board of all FDI options, a foreign firm prefers a merger to a joint venture if the efficiency of cost-reducing investments is small.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherUniversity of Otagoen_NZ
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEconomics Discussion Papers Seriesen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ/research/discussionpapers/DP_0513.pdfen_NZ
dc.subjectmultinational firmsen_NZ
dc.subjectmergeren_NZ
dc.subjectjoint ventureen_NZ
dc.subjectgreenfield investmenten_NZ
dc.subjectForeign direct investmenten_NZ
dc.subject.lcshHB Economic Theoryen_NZ
dc.titleThe choice of market entry mode: greenfield Investment, M&A and joint venturesen_NZ
dc.typeDiscussion Paperen_NZ
dc.description.versionUnpublisheden_NZ
otago.bitstream.pages23en_NZ
otago.date.accession2006-02-02en_NZ
otago.schoolEconomicsen_NZ
otago.openaccessOpen
otago.place.publicationDunedin, New Zealanden_NZ
dc.identifier.eprints210en_NZ
otago.school.eprintsEconomicsen_NZ
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otago.relation.number513en_NZ
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